Commentary by Martha A. Schlicher
Commentary
Martha A. Schlicher
ever achieve and thus sentences us to a future of
gasoline and its negative consequences?
Astonishingly, a fuel that meets all of these
criteria exists today. Ethanol from corn will provide
U.S. vehicles more than 10 billion gallons of their
fuel consumption in 2009. In the next several years,
ethanol from a multitude of other feedstocks (such
as garbage, wood chips, and unused plant material)
could greatly increase our domestic renewable fuel
production.
Despite the already significant contribution to
our ongoing fuel needs and tremendous prospects
for future contributions in only a few short years,
ethanol’s brightest days may be in the rearview
mirror (of a car fueled by Mideast and Venezuelan
oil).
How could a source that today meets so many
of our objectives for a perfect fuel become so unpop-
ular? How could the United States forgo a substan-
tial and growing renewable fuel source for concepts
that “may deliver something better, someday”?
The concept of ethanol as a renewable fuel was
believed to be the ultimate vehicle fuel solution
as far back as the turn of the last century with great
agriculturalists like George Washington Carver,
great industrialists like Henry Ford, and great
inventors like Thomas Edison (Kovarik, 1998). The
idea was revitalized in the 1970s during the Arab oil
embargo when we feared for the security of our oil
supplies (Shapouri, Duffield, and Graboski, 1995).
The idea came back again in the mid-1980s when
corn growers realized their net return from burn-
ing a bushel of corn was greater than from selling
it to the feed market (Dorn, 2005).
I
f we could create the perfect fuel, what
would that be? It would be a fuel that
would burn clean, improving the quality of
our air. It would be a fuel that comes from
many diverse, renewable resources so that we
wouldn’t be dependent on any one source and
sources would never be depleted. It would be a
fuel derived from readily available resources that
have alternative uses, meaning that a raw supply
infrastructure is already in place—and ideally,
from which multiple products, in addition to
fuel, could be made. It would be a fuel that
would be miscible with current fuels, which
would allow for its ready and economical use in
existing vehicles and with the existing fuel-deliv-
ery infrastructure.
Time is not an ally and so our perfect fuel would
be able to be produced immediately, bypassing
Nobel Prize–winning science, unresolved technol-
ogy issues, and uncertainty. Our fuel would be pro-
duced close to where it would be used, on a small
enough scale that barriers to entry would be mini-
mized, fuel costs to transport the product would be
low, and the risk of centralized supplies or produc-
tion to our national security would be lessened. It
would be a fuel that would run as efficiently, or even
more efficiently, than gasoline does today with little
or no vehicle modifications. And finally, it would
be a fuel that would readily break down in soil or
water, which would dramatically reduce the envi-
ronmental consequence of an accidental spill.
Does such a unique combination of attributes
exist? Or is the list of desired criteria too lofty to
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The idea made sense and the time was right.
Energy costs were high, with corn worth more as a
fuel than as a feed. Agricultural corn productivity
continued to gain with no increased outlet and thus
corn prices continued to languish. And standard
production technologies for corn-based ethanol had
been optimized such that plants could be built in
an assembly-line fashion to run reproducibly and
reliably.
The U.S. ethanol industry started when farmers,
livestock producers, local businesses, and coopera-
tives pooled their own capital and invested in
new-generation corn-based ethanol plants. Their
objectives were clear: Increase demand for their
product and create new revenue opportunities.
What could not have been fully understood at the
time was the positive impact of these plants on
the environment and on revitalizing rural commu-
nities by creating jobs, new income, and new tax
sources.
Growth of the corn-based ethanol industry was
evolutionary, initially with plants averaging 20
million gallons per year (MGY) of production capac-
ity (Hettinga et al., 2009). These early cooperatives
were firmly rooted in rural agriculture. They were
composed of local equity investment and agricul-
tural debt providers who understood the cyclical
nature inherent in agriculture and the low margins
that could be expected from a commodity business.
The majority of this growth was in the western U.S.
Corn Belt where corn yields were high, local live-
stock production could use the animal feed coprod-
ucts, and local and regional markets could use the
ethanol. Rail lines built to ship grain to California
could also deliver ethanol and the animal feed
resulting from ethanol production.
Modest plant construction allowed corn pro-
ductivity growth to keep pace with the increased
demand for corn (Korves, 2008). In other words,
while farmers consistently increased their produc-
tivity (yields) in small increments each year, the
small incremental growth of ethanol plants and
the corn supply they required was not disruptive
to corn supply and demand.
The ethanol produced in those early plants
helped to meet the reformulated gasoline require-
ments in clean-air attainment zones and began to
make its way into broader E10 (gasoline mixed
with 10 percent ethanol) and E85 (gasoline mixed
with 85 percent ethanol) applications. Investors
were satisfied with their modest returns because
of the ancillary benefits: a local alternative market
for their corn, jobs for their community, and incre-
mental expenditures for other services the plant
required. The hardware store, the corn grower, the
grocery store, the bank, the restaurants, the munici-
pal government, and the local environment all
benefited.
Demand for ethanol rose as states’ clean-air
requirements began to phase out gasoline oxygenate
additives suspected of causing cancer (methyl 
tertiary-butyl ether [MTBE]), turning instead to
ethanol. This new demand was accelerated by fed-
eral legislation that prescribed renewable fuels as
a component of the gasoline blend. The 2005 Energy
Policy Act (EPACT; Energy Policy Act, 2005) pro-
vided a renewable fuel standard (RFS) requirement
for major petroleum blenders to blend 7.5 billion
gallons per year (BGY) of renewable fuel (largely
ethanol) with gasoline by 2015. More importantly,
the act provided no limited liability protection for
the use of MTBE. Because of the mandatory require-
ments to blend fuels to meet clean-air requirements,
the oil industry now needed to blend fuels above
the minimum level stipulated by the RFS. They
rapidly exited their MTBE contracts and moved
into ethanol, which briefly drove up the price of
ethanol from less than $2.00 gallon in November
of 2005 to $4.00 per gallon and higher prices by
June 2006 (Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development [CARD]).
Federal legislation created a clear marketing
opportunity, and new investors from outside tra-
ditional agriculture entered the market. These new
investors augmented local investors, which allowed
equity to be raised more quickly. Many of these new
investors also brought their knowledge and exper  -
tise from other industries and were astonished to
find that the modern ethanol production technolo-
gies lacked many of the advancements common-
place in other process manufacturing facilities.
While many investors were interested in dra-
matically improving the process and energy efficien-
cies of new ethanol plants with readily available
technology, they were quick to learn that established
financing structures prevented funding of anything
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but a standard plant design template. Debt providers
for new plants wanted a “sure thing” to quickly
exploit the market opportunity. Improving plant
technology and efficiency was not their motive for
entering the market. Although higher debt loads
were allowed to accommodate higher construction
costs in a booming market, significant incremental
operational requirements that added cost were also
brought in. These requirements often included the
use of external providers for corn merchandising,
risk management, ethanol marketing, and coproduct
marketing. Senior debt covenants limited incre-
mental capital investment, which further restricted
the adoption of significant technological improve-
ments that experienced industrial manufacturers
viewed as fundamental to the industry’s future
operational and financial success.
Providers of ethanol-processing equipment
were also slow to push new and better technology
because the new owners were positioned to buy
quickly from the preestablished menu. The “old
stuff” was clearly in high demand, commanding a
premium, and selling in volume. Providers were
having difficulty meeting demand and resources
were not available to invest in the future. Remin  is  -
cent of Henry Ford’s first Model T assembly lines,
you could purchase and finance any process design
“as long as it was black.”
While it was expected that Wall Street’s deep
pockets would bring modern technology invest-
ments that would positively evolve the plants, this
was not the case. New owners faced a dilemma: a
choice of available project financing if they accepted
the current state of technology, or an inability to
finance their projects if they tried to improve them.
Most invested, believing they would first pay off
their debt and then add the diversification and
enhancement capabilities core to a successful
industrial production facility.
Logistical efficiencies remained despite growth
of the industry because ethanol plant coproducts
could now directly substitute for corn transported
to cattle feed markets. These coproducts, contain-
ing all the protein, fat, and fiber of corn in a more
concentrated form, cost less to transport per pound
of nutrient value. West Coast markets matured, and
southern and eastern ethanol and feed markets
began to develop. Thus, plants began to spring up
in the eastern Corn Belt with eastern-serving rail
service. U.S. ethanol production capacity increased
30 percent from the end of 2005 to the end of 2006
(Renewable Fuels Association [RFA]). The large
volume of corn-based ethanol now entering the
distribution channel was beginning to take market
share from petroleum refiners.
The nonagricultural state environmental groups
became concerned that the growth of corn-based
ethanol forced more land into cultivation and neg-
atively affected our global carbon footprint. A
groundswell of interest had also developed from
earlier Department of Energy (DOE) work about the
promise of using “wasteland” (nonproductive land)
for the production of biomass crops that could
“eliminate all the problems associated with corn
based ethanol.” Environmental groups, academic
groups, DOE scientists with looming job cuts, and
states with vast acres of nonproductive land coa-
lesced to create broad-spread bipartisan support for
a bill that would limit corn-based ethanol and pin
future promise on alternative feedstocks and fuels.
In December 2007, the Energy Independence
and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 was enacted, man-
dating 15 BGY of ethanol by 2015—up from the 7.5
BGY mandated in EPACT—and 36 BGY of renew-
able fuels by 2022 (EISA, 2007). Fifteen BGY was
allowed for corn-based ethanol, and the remainder
was allocated to cellulosic and other advanced bio-
fuels (defined as any renewable feedstock except
corn-based starch to ethanol). A ceiling was placed
on corn-based ethanol because it was believed the
need for corn for both food and fuel was causing
additional land to go into agronomic production
with speculated negative environmental conse-
quences. EISA mandated that renewable fuels must
demonstrate a carbon footprint 50 percent to 60
percent better than conventional gasoline and that
new corn-based ethanol production facilities must
demonstrate a footprint 20 percent better than
gasoline.
In his February 2007 State of the Union speech,
President George W. Bush proclaimed that 36 BGY
of renewable fuel production, outlined in the yet to
be passed Energy Bill, would allow us to eliminate
three-quarters of all the oil currently imported
from the Middle East…as if the 16 BGY associated
with cellulosic ethanol was right around the corner.
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extrapolation of their future potential, and then
used these assumptions to dictate volume limits
15 years into the future.
For example, because sugar cane–based and
cellulosic-based ethanol combust their by-products
to fuel their plants, with the RFS measurements
they are credited with minimizing fossil fuel use.
In contrast, corn-based ethanol production is not
recognized as having the same ability to minimize
its fossil fuel use, even though this possibility
exists. With this comparison, the bill wrongly relies
on old corn ethanol technology performance and
willfully ignores not only the new corn ethanol
technology but also the current scientific and tech-
nological work that will result in commercial
application during the life of the bill. And while
legislators overlooked the potential of an industry
already providing more than 9 BGY with outdated
technology, future manufacturing concepts yet to
be proved were not so burdened. As noted, sugar
cane–based and cellulosic-based ethanol were
again assumed to use their by-products to fuel
their plants. Never were the technologies of a
corn-based ethanol plant, with the adoption of
technologies commercially viable today, used as
the basis of comparison with either sugar cane–
or cellulosic-based technologies. This yawning
recognition gap in the opportunity for continued
adoption of new technologies—allowing corn-
based ethanol to deliver in the near term the same
environmental benefits as cellulosic-based ethanol
when it moves out of the laboratory and into com-
mercial application—was completely missing from
the 2007 EISA.
In addition to capping the volumes of allowable
corn-based ethanol, the base number of gallons
allowed was assumed “mature” and incapable of
improving over time such that additional gallons
could be warranted. Second, DOE funding was
focused on an initiative to create a future technol-
ogy. No funding was provided as a bridge from the
current technology to that future state. This gap
created the real and significant potential for the
demise of the existing ethanol industry. With no
future corn-based ethanol industry, no outlet above
10 BGY of production would be required, thereby
eliminating the need for infrastructure develop-
ment to ensure a future outlet for cellulosic ethanol
The bill misrepresented what was possible given
the current state of the science, providing the
American public with a false understanding of the
current potential of renewable fuels. The new law
additionally served as a lightning rod to those
already opposed to renewable fuels to organize and
actively oppose its vision and the tangible reality
of 15 BGY from corn-based ethanol.
Most astonishingly, the new bill provided the
framework for the demise of the existing corn-based
ethanol industry, which would effectively end the
cellulosic-based industry before it was ever allowed
to start. The bill neglected to offer a plan providing
for the transition from an existing technology (corn-
based ethanol) to the experimental technology
(cellulosic ethanol) or for a certain channel for the
product. Such a plan would have ensured a steady
and increasing volume of renewable fuel to meet
the requirements established in the RFS and a dis-
tribution system for it.
First, the vast operational efficiencies available
to corn-based ethanol through available technology
were bypassed for an alternative fuel that is literally
still on the drawing boards. Second, the bill lacked
a viable implementation plan to provide a mecha-
nism for blending the renewable fuels mandated
into the existing gasoline supply. Third, the bill
created an ill-defined requirement for biofuels to
achieve life-cycle greenhouse gas reductions rela-
tive to gasoline produced in 2005, including any
indirect impact of the use of the land for biofuel
production. Finally, the 15 billion gallons of corn
ethanol allowed by the RFS immediately created a
real and significant threat to the oil industry.
The EISA capped corn-based ethanol volume
via a false premise that inaccurately compared it
with other fuels while failing to recognize the well-
known fact that corn ethanol performance could
substantially improve with modest investment in
available technology. In determining RFS-required
volumes, the bill compared today’s nascent corn-
based ethanol industry with the mature sugar cane–
based ethanol industry and the theoretical cellulosic
ethanol industry in its risk/reward assumptions.
This was one of the most frustrating aspects of the
bill—it included narrowly selected measurements
of the impact of renewable fuels, with limitedtechnologies. This, by definition, capped our com-
mitment to renewable fuel at a volume less than
10 percent of our gasoline usage and well below
our imported volume of oil.
Why is corn ethanol’s success essential to
cellulosics? Although cellulosic ethanol remains
a promising future fuel for reducing our depen  -
dence on gasoline as a vehicle fuel source, the time
required for cellulosic ethanol to overcome signifi-
cant feedstock, logistical, and production issues is
not insignificant and well beyond the time allotted
for production volumes established in the RFS.
Additionally, the first significant volume of cellu-
losic ethanol is likely to come from the fiber already
brought into existing corn ethanol production facili-
ties as a part of the corn kernel. This type of cellu-
losic ethanol is not a new concept and, in addition
to wood chips, is the nearest-term viable means
of producing cellulosic ethanol. It is important to
note that efforts have existed since the oil crisis
of the 1970s to demonstrate its commercial viabil-
ity. In 1993, the DOE National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) declared its technology for con-
verting corn cellulose ethanol ready for commercial-
ization (NREL, 1993). Fifteen years and billions of
dollars later, corn cellulose is still not ready to be
produced on a commercial scale. And this technol-
ogy, requiring only process-conversion technology
development, will be ready long before the incre-
mental work required to develop energy crops still
in the developmental stages.
The current corn-based ethanol industry pro-
vides a means of developing the infrastructure
required for cellulosic ethanol distribution. With
lower costs of production and a real product to dis-
tribute, corn-based ethanol should be in a position
to bear, along with the petroleum industry, the costs
for infrastructure development.
The Energy Bill did not adequately address the
infrastructure challenges of a 36 BGY RFS. This
created a constraint for market growth and thus a
supply/demand-driven market demise via margin
erosion. The RFS of 36 BGY implied that 36 BGY
of renewable fuels would be blended into the exist-
ing petroleum base of 140 BGY of gasoline-based
transportation fuel. Gasoline infrastructure today
allows for the blending of ethanol up to 10 percent
in conventional vehicles, or roughly 11.6 BGY. This
number excludes states that do not allow blending
at 10 percent and small refiners not required to
blend.
Higher use of E85 would create a significant
incremental outlet for ethanol. However, while a
blenders’ credit of $0.51/gallon was created in
EPACT and retained in EISA (reduced to $0.45/
gallon in 2009) for the petroleum industry to add
the infrastructure required for full incorporation
of E10 and adoption of E85, there has been little to
no adoption of E85 by the major oil companies.
With ethanol distribution today limited to E10,
the size of the market for E10 is entirely dependent
on the RFS floor (10.5 BGY in 2009) when ethanol
prices (including the blenders’ credit) exceed gaso-
line prices and is capped when gasoline prices
exceed ethanol prices by the ability to blend E10:
today approximately 12 to 13 BGY. Additionally,
because petroleum blenders are allowed to “carry
over” a portion of their blending requirements,
even with an RFS floor, use of higher blend levels
when ethanol’s price is low allows blenders to
underblend when the ethanol price is high. With
2008 use well above the RFS, petroleum blenders’
2009 mandatory blending—at an ethanol price
greater than gasoline—could be 1 to 2 BG less than
the 10.5 BG mandated.
As the Energy Bill was passed, incremental
ethanol capacity was already under development
because its lead time from construction to opera-
tion is more than two years. Thus, despite signifi-
cantly reduced margins and production already
above and beyond the new RFS schedule, the indus-
try, with already committed capital, moved from
56 plants in 2000 producing 1.8 BGY to more than
180 plants in 2008 capable of producing more
than 10 BGY (RFA). Thus, installed ethanol plant
capacity was on line to meet the RFS mandate for
2009, 2010, and beyond. All capacity now became
vulnerable with production volumes above the RFS
and the lack of a “blending home.” Older plants
faced higher operating costs and inefficient logistics;
newer plants faced higher debt loads. No plants
were positioned to have the capital available or
accessible to add technological innovations to
improve their base assets.
Rapid industry capacity growth created specu-
lation about the dramatic increase in the renewable
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fuel industry purchasing a portion of the annual
U.S. corn crop, which led to corn market specula-
tion that resulted in skyrocketing corn prices.
Further, a poor European wheat harvest, increased
global demand for grain, and dramatic flooding
across key parts of the U.S. Corn Belt combined to
create uncertainty about 2008 corn production.
High and erratic corn pricing resulted, surpassed
only by new highs in the price for oil and gasoline
at the pump. Food companies raised prices to pro-
tect margins and were quick to cast the blame on
fuel-based ethanol’s demand for corn despite the
small cost of grain to their total product cost
(Rosenfeld, 2008).
Oil companies were further threatened by the
growing volume of ethanol reducing their refining
capacity needs. Food companies were threatened
by an alternative demand for their feedstock that
increased prices. A well-funded, well-organized
campaign convinced consumers and legislators
around the world that corn-based ethanol was caus-
ing starvation and food riots. An organized, fact-
based information campaign was never conceived
by the fragmented and poorly funded ethanol indus-
try. Many of the anti-ethanol campaign messages
are now taken as fact by legislators, the media, and
other stakeholders.
Seizing another opportunity to increase the
vulnerability of the industry, those opposed to
corn-based ethanol began a similar campaign
related to the life-cycle assessment requirements
outlined in the Energy Bill. A campaign suggesting
that land used for fuel instead of food production
was not being appropriately penalized for its global
warming impact in determining the fuel’s environ-
mental benefits. Because this criterion had never
been used to determine any alternative use—say,
the impact of a new subdivision, an acre grown for
nonhealthy versus healthy food, or a marginal acre
used for cellulosic instead of food production—
new theories about how to make this determination
were placed on the back of—and remain on the
back of—corn-based ethanol.
The number of U.S. farm acres has largely
remained flat and total tonnage of protein, fat, and
fiber available for food consumption is greater than
at any time in U.S. history (despite the increase
in corn-based ethanol production), yet it is now
believed important that an environmental penalty
be assigned to corn-based ethanol in the form of the
indirect land impacted—that is, the land forced
into production, from the U.S. use of a portion of
its corn crop for corn-based ethanol. The ongoing
debate about how to determine and assign indirect
land use environmental impacts in the form of its
global warming impact to corn-based ethanol pro-
duction—first to corn and then to cellulosic
ethanol—successfully creates further uncertainty
about the future of renewables, effectively stalling
future investment to improve the base industry or
to create incremental capacity.
Despite all this, the mid-2008 U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) production reports were
beginning to indicate that corn yields were on track
for another bumper crop. At the same time the
economy began to falter, high gasoline prices led
to a precipitous drop in fuel consumption and miles
driven, and corn prices plummeted from a high of
$7.99/bushel in late June to $5.40 in mid-August
(Platts, 2008). Ethanol companies, unable to lock
in margins owing to the lack of a forward market
from the oil companies for ethanol, were caught
with corn cost positions exceeding ethanol sales
prices. A number of these companies, with signifi-
cant exposure, took large write-offs, required addi-
tional capital infusions from shareholders, or
declared bankruptcy. With the ethanol supply con-
tinuing to exceed mandated demand and at a price
above which discretionary blending of ethanol is
unattractive, ethanol margins remained razor-thin
and often negative.
Stalled construction, a lack of new construction,
and continued bankruptcies continued to reduce
available capacity, leading to production 20 percent
below available capacity (Caldwell, 2008). A lack
of confidence in the future of the industry limited
interest in acquisition of existing facilities or the
investment required to transform these facilities
into true biorefineries that could also produce food
and eliminate their fossil fuel use.
Cellulosic start-ups began to announce delays
in technology development, the ability to access
and develop feedstock, and the ability to secure
financing. The DOE publicly indicated that the
near-term RFS goals for cellulosic ethanol would not
be met (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2008). In addition, overcoming the cellulosic tech-
Schlichernical hurdles to meet the RFS-mandated volume
and meeting the timeline objectives outlined in
the Energy Bill are proving difficult. Corn-based
ethanol could most certainly help to bridge this
gap, even if the industry is held to the same global
warming reduction impacts possible with cellu-
losics, yet we have turned our back on it. Thus,
while oil and gasoline imports continue, more than
2 BGY (>20%) of the existing available capacity for
corn-based ethanol is idled and estimates suggest
another 2 BGY reduction is possible.
All of this is happening when a simple solution
exists. Instead of the DOE and the USDA funding
only the speculative and basic research needs of a
future industry, they could, in addition, provide
grants and loan guarantees for the adoption of cur-
rently available and commercially demonstrated
technologies in existing corn-based production
facilities. These facilities would be those with a
demonstrated ability to produce fuel and an interest
in and ability to incorporate readily available tech-
nologies. These technologies would allow corn-
based ethanol to deliver environmentally and
economically viable ethanol with a 50 percent
reduction in the carbon footprint impact—an
impact that today is already 40 percent better than
gasoline (Mueller and Copenhaver, 2008). This
approach would bridge the time gap and techno-
logical innovation required for the introduction
of cellulosic ethanol and other advanced biofuels
today. This would allow time for the development
of the blending infrastructure and regulations
required to blend above the 10 percent level, it
would ensure continued diversification of our fuel
supply, and it would allow time for the develop-
ment of the innovations so critical to the future of
our energy independence.
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